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I.

INTRODUCTION"

Prior to enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) provided that distributions of property in kind to ben-

Associate, Magruder, Montgomery,

Brocato & Hosemann, Jackson, Mississippi. B.A.,

1982, University of Mississippi; J.D., 1985, University of Mississippi; LL.M., 1986, University of
Florida. This paper was prepared as part of the requirements of the University of Florida Graduate
Tax Program.
* * Unless otherwise provided, all code references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, as amended. [Ed. note. On October 22, 1986, Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of
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eficiaries of a trust or estate were deemed to carry out distributable net income
(DNI) to the extent of the property's fair market value at the time of distribution.' In such transactions, the trust or estate realized no gain or loss on
the distribution unless the distribution was in satisfaction of a right to receive
2
a specific dollar amount or specific property other than that distributed.
The general effect of an in kind distribution of appreciated or depreciated
property was a deduction to the estate or trust equal to the property's fair
market value (provided there was sufficient DNI) and gross income of like
amount to the beneficiary. In addition, the beneficiary received a fair market
value basis in the property while the unrealized gain or loss in the distributed
property went unrecognized to the trust or estate.3 This treatment was inconsistent with the consequences resulting from a sale of the property by the trust
or estate and subsequent distribution of the proceeds to the beneficiary. If income
from such a sale were allocated to corpus, the entity would pay tax on the
gain. The transaction would otherwise have the same economic results as the
first mentioned distribution. Thus, two transactions that were in substance the
same had different consequences as a result of application of Treasury Regulation section 1.661(a)-2(f)(1)-(3).
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 significantly changed the treatment of
like-kind distributions from estates or trusts. 4 New section 643(e) provides the
general rule that distributions of property from a trust or estate are treated as
carrying out DNI only to the extent of the lesser of the property's basis, adjusted
for gain or loss recognized by the trust or estate on the distribution, or fair
market value at the time of distribution. 5 However, section 643(e)(3) allows the
fiduciary to elect to recognize gain or loss on the distribution as if there had
been a sale to the beneficiary at fair market value.' Thus, under the general
rule a trust or estate may no longer distribute appreciated or depreciated property to a beneficiary at a fair market basis and recognize no gain or loss on
the transaction. Unless an election to recognize gain or loss is made, the beneficiary takes a basis equal to the trust or estate's basis in the property.
The fiduciary's election, therefore, can have negative or positive consequences to beneficiaries, depending on their relative interests in the corpus or
income and applicable fiduciary accounting rules. Under certain fiduciary accounting rules, an election under section 643(e) may result in one beneficiary's
receiving tax benefits while another bears the economic burden. Arguably,
such a result justifies some equitable adjustment through the application of the

1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 12. Provision was
made to rename the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Id.
5 2 (hereinafter referred to as Int. Rev. Code of 1986)].
1. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(0(2) (West 1986).

2. Id. S 1.661(a)-2()(1).
3. Id. S 1.661(a)-2()(3).
4. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 81, 1984 U.S.
ADMIN. NEws (98 Stat.) 597.
5. I.R.C. § 643(e)(2) (West 1986).
6. Id. § 643(e)(3)(A)(ii).
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"equitable adjustment doctrine." 7 Courts have applied the doctrine in similar
situations. 8 This paper presents an overview of the purposes and present application of both the equitable adjustment doctrine and section 643(e). 9 The
paper then discusses the possibility of such an adjustment and its consequences
under section 643(e).
II.

THE EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT DOCTRINE

Courts have applied the equitable adjustment doctrine when a fiduciary's
elections or decisions financially benefitted some beneficiaries to the detriment
of others. Inequitable consequences can arise because the beneficiaries may have
differing property interests under local law. An equitable adjustment is a method
to compensate for disproportionate sharing of tax burdens through a reallocation
of assets from one beneficiary's account to that of another. Considering actual
tax consequences, a reallocation or adjustment achieves the goal of impartial
treatment of beneficiaries as required under local law.
Much debate and controversy has arisen concerning the applicability of the
equitable adjustment doctrine and adjustments that should be made when it
does apply. 10 The tax consequences of such adjustments are also at issue." The
basis of equitable adjustments lies in at least two aspects of the fiduciary duty:
(1) the duty of impartiality, and (2) the duty to minimize taxes.' 2 The duty

7. See infra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
8. See Freeland, Maxfield & Sawyer, Estate and Trust Distributions of Property in Kind After the
Tax Reform Act of 1984, 40 TAx L. REy. 449, 457 n.29 (1985); Raattama & Sawyer, Interaction of
the New I.R.C. § 643(e) Election and Florida's Equitable Adjustment Doctrine, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1985, at
97 (suggesting such an adjustment may be necessary).
9. See infra §III.
10. For a comprehensive discussion of the equitable adjustment doctrine, see Blattmachr, The
1400Tax Effects of Equitable Adjustments: An Internal Revenue Code Odyssey, 18 INST. ON EST. PLAN.
1415 (1984); Carrico & Bondurant, Equitable Adjustments: A Survy and Analysis of Precedents and Practice,
36 TAx LA.w. 545 (1983); Dobris, Equitable Adjustments in Postmortem Income Tax Planning:An Unremitting
Diet of Warms, 65 IowA L. REv. 103 (1979).
11. See sources cited supra note 10.
12. Generally the duties of a trustee and personal representative are comparable, with the
exception of a few minor variations. The primary duties found applicable to the fiduciary are as
follows:
(1) The duty to use ordinary skill and prudence in the management of the trust or estate.
(2) The duty of loyalty, requiring the executor to administer the estate for the benefit of
creditors first and beneficiaries second. The trustee is required to administer trust property
for the benefit of the beneficiary. (3) The duty to not delegate. The fiduciary is under a
duty to personally perform duties of his office and cannot transfer administration of the
trust to another person. However, the trustee can delegate performance of certain acts
which it is unreasonable to expect him or her to perform. (4) The duty to keep accounts.
(5) The duty to furnish information regarding the nature and amount of trust property
at the request of the beneficiary. (6) The duty to take and keep control of trust property.
(7) The duty to make trust property productive. (8) The duty to pay income to the
beneficiary as provided by the trust. (9) The duty of impartiality when dealing with beneficiaries. (10) The duty of co-fiduciaries to participate in the administration of the trust
or estate and use reasonable care to prevent a co-fiduciary from committing a breach of
trust. (11) The duty to resist revocation of a trust where the trust instrument provides for
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of impartiality requires the fiduciary to act impartially toward beneficiaries and
prohibits sacrificing the interest of one beneficiary by making a tax election
that benefits another. 13 The duty to minimize taxes is derived from the fiduciary's duty to conserve trust or estate assets and to make the property rea14
sonably productive.
Courts and legislatures have not given extensive attention to the equitable
adjustments doctrine. Therefore, there is a lack of uniformity in its application. 15
This article will not address all situations in which the doctrine might arise but
will focus on those adjustments especially relevant to the analysis of an ad16
justment in the context of a section 643(e) election.
A.

The Warms Adjustment

The earliest reported case applying the equitable adjustment doctrine was
In re Warms' Estate.'7 In Warms, the executor elected, pursuant to section 642(g),
to deduct administration expenses on the estate's income tax return rather than
as an estate tax deduction. Under fiduciary accounting rules, administration
expenses were paid out of principal of the residuary estate. Thus, the income
tax deduction benefitted the income beneficiary while the remainderman bore
the economic burden of expenses. In addition, estate taxes increased as a result
of not deducting administration expenses on the estate tax return. The additional
tax was paid from principal. The court determined an adjustment was warranted
and chose to have the income account reimburse the principal account for
increased estate taxes resulting from use of the expenses as income tax deductions rather than estate tax deductions.' 8

revocation only with the consent of the trustee. (12) The duty to preserve trust property.
(13) The duty to take all reasonable steps to enforce claims. (14) The duty to act reasonably

in defending claims against the trust or estate. (15) The duty to keep trust property separate
from the trustee's own property and property of other trusts, and to earmark the trust
property as property of the trust.

See EST. & TRUST PRAc. & FID. REsP. (IBP)
35,501 - 35,515.17 (1979); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS §S 93-124 (5th ed. 1973).
13. See, e.g., Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth, 32 Eng. Rep. 56 (1802); see also G. BOGERT &
G. BOGERT, supra, note 12, at S 106; A. ScoTT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS 5 183 (3d ed. 1967); Dobris,
supra note 10, 107-08.
14. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 12, at S 101; A. Sco-r, supra note 12, at S
181; Dobris, supra note 10, at 107-08.
15. See Carrico & Bondurant, supra note 10 (analyzing existing case and statutory law).
16. See Blattmachr, supra note 10, at
1402 (identifying ten situations where courts have
made equitable adjustments).
17. 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sur. Ct. 1955).
18. Id. at 171. The special guardian for the instant remainderman argued that administration
expenses should be charged to the income account. The court rejected the argument, reasoning
that the source of payment of expenses does not change because expenses were charged to income
rather than principal. Id. at 170.
The following example illustrates how a Warms adjustment might arise. Assume an estate with
taxable income of $100,000 and taxable estate, without regard to administration expenses, of $500,000.
Additionally, tax rates for both income and estate taxes are 50% and administration expenses are

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss5/5
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AdCourts in other states have also invoked the Warms "adjustment."
20
ditionally, it is local practice in some states to make such adjustments. Although there has been little legislative activity in the equitable adjustments area,
21
at least three states have statutes allowing Warms adjustments. New York and
Maryland have similar statutes requiring adjustment- without a need to incorporate the statutory power by reference, provided the will expresses no provision
to the contrary. 2 2 Connecticut takes a different approach, permitting specified
fiduciary powers to be incorporated by reference in wills and trusts.Y One such
power directs the fiduciary to claim certain administration expenses, casualty
losses, and other expenses to achieve the lowest overall tax liability for the estate
and beneficiaries. 24 An adjustment is required when the fiduciary's election
results in a greater portion of estate tax being paid from and charged to principal
25
than if a contrary election had been made.

Following Warms, courts faced questions of whether adjustments should be
made when the section 642(g) election affects marital and nonmarital beneficiaries. The election affects the marital share when the bequest is dependent
on the size of the estate after deductions for administration expenses or when

$25,000. If the administration expenses are deducted on the estate return, the estate tax will be
$237,500 (as shown below). However, if expenses are deducted on the income tax return, estate

taxes will be $250,000 with income taxes' reduced by $12,500 (as shown below).

Taxable Estate
(Before Adm. Exp)
Adm. Expense Deduction
Taxable Estate
Tax Rate
Tax

No Section 642(g)
Election

Section 642(g)
Election Made

$500,000

$500,000

( 25,000)

475,000
x 50%
$237,500

--

500,000
x 50%
$250,000

The principal account bears the burden of paying administration expenses even when deductions
benefit the income beneficiary pursuant to a 5 642(g) election. The income account would be
required to reimburse principal for the $12,500 increase in estate taxes resulting from the § 6 42(g)
election.
19.

See In re Bixby's Estate, 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 295 P.2d 68 (1956) (adoption of "Warms

adjustment" in California); In re Veith's Estate, 26 Fla. Supp. 145 (Dade County Ct. 1965) (same
in Florida); In re Keht's Estate, 23 Fla. Supp. 133 (Palm Beach County Ct. 1964) (same); In re
Bell's Estate, 8 Ches. Co. Rep. 21 (Orphan's Ct. 1956) (same in Pennsylvania), aff'd, 393 Pa.
623, 144 A.2d 843 (1958); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Sanders, 84 R.I. 347, 125 A.2d 100
(1956) (same in Rhode Island).
20. See Carrico & Bondurant, supra note 10 (discussing local practices in Colorado, Georgia,
Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon and Wyoming).

5

21. Connecticut, Maryland and New York. See infra notes 22-23.
22. MD. ESTATE & TRUST CODE ANN. § 11-106(a) (1974); N.Y. EST. POwERS & TRUSTS
11-1.2(A) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
23. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100(e)(35)(B) (West 1981).

LAW

24. Id.
25. Id.
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there is a maximum marital deduction dause. With the exception of one
case,
26
the courts have refused to require adjustment in these circumstances.
B.

The Rice Adjustment

Under Subchapter J, the taxable income of an estate or trust will be affected
by the computation of DNI. 27 Section 643(a) defines DNI as taxable income
of the estate or trust computed with certain modifications. 28 One of the modifications is an exclusion for capital gains allocated to corpus and not actually
29
distributed, required to be distributed, or permanently set aside for charity.
When a fiduciary sells an asset, the expenses attributable to the sale, such
as commissions and state capital gain taxes, are allocated to principal under
fiduciary accounting rules." These expenditures, however, reduce DNI even
when payable from principal. 3' These deductions reduce income allocable to
principal only when they exceed DNI. 3 Congress expressly provided for this
result so that deductions paid from corpus would not go to waste.3 3 However,
the effect of the allocation deprives principal, the source giving rise to the
deductible expenditure, of the tax benefit of the deduction in years when it has
taxible gain.
For example, assume a trust has taxable ordinary income of $25,000 and
a capital gain of $5,000, along with $3,000 of deductions attributable to a
capital gain. The deduction will reduce ordinary income but not capital gain.
When a fiduciary makes a sale, recognizing gain and generating deductible
expenses allocable to corpus, an unfair allocation is automatically made through
interaction of the DNI system and fiduciary accounting rules. Contrary to the
diversion remedied by the Warms adjustment, this diversion is not the result
of a fiduciary's election; arguably, then, no adjustment is needed. 34 No state
has adopted a statute allowing for adjustment in this situation. Moreover, the
Uniform Principal and Income Act requires no adjustment. 35 Presently, there
is a split of authority concerning whether an equitable adjustment is required

26. See In re Veith's Estate, 26 Fla. Supp. 145 (Dade County Ct. 1954) (adjustment not
required); In re McTarnahan's Estate, 27 Misc. 2d 13, 202 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sur. Ct. 1960) (same);
In re Inman's Estate, 22 Misc. 2d 573, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sur. Ct. 1959) (same). But see In re

Levy's Estate, 9 Misc. 2d 561, 167 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sur. Ct. 1957) (adjustment required).
27. See I.R.C. § 643 (West 1986).
28. Id. S 643(a).
29. Id. S 643(a)(3); Treas. Reg. 5 1.643(a)-3 (West 1986).
30. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 738.13(3) (1985); N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUsT LAW S 11-2.1(d)(1)
(McKinney 1967).
31. See Treas. Reg. § 1.643(d)-2 (West 1986) (illustration of the § 643 provisions).

32. See Moore, Conflicts in Post-Mortem Planning After the Tax Reform Act, 12
§5 600-609 (1978).

INST. ON

EST.

PLAN.

33.
34.

See Dobris, supra note 10, at 120.
See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.

35.

REv. UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss5/5
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from the income account to reimburse principal for an increase in income taxes
36
borne by the principal account by reason of the Code.
Rice Estate" involved a sale by the trustee in which gain of $400,000 was
realized, resulting in a capital gain tax of approximately $100,000. Deductible
attorney's fees of $202,000 were charged to principal, while the tax benefit of
these fees inured to the income beneficiary. 38 Since there was a fifty percent
capital gain deduction in effect at the time of the sale, 39 that deduction, combined with the attorney's fees, would have reduced taxable gain to zero. The
court ordered the income account to reimburse the principal account for the
increase in capital gains taxes borne by the corpus as a result of expense
allocations to the benefit of the income account as required under Subchapter
J.40 In making its decision, the court cited Warms as precedent, disregarding
the absence of any fiduciary election as to whether principal expenditures would
reduce DNI.

41

However, in In re Estate of Dick,42 the New York Surrogate Court refused
to make the adjustment required by the Rice court, reasoning that Warms did
not justify an adjustment. The court emphasized that Warms involved a fiduciary's exercise of a statutory election while in the case before it the trustee
was not granted an option. 43 Dick was followed by a Florida court in In re
Kent's Estate.44
C.

Trapping Distributions

A common technique employed to tax estate income at lower marginal brackets is the "trapping distribution." 45 The trustee often accomplishes income split36.

See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. See also notes 60-69 and accompanying text.

37. 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 379 (1956).
38. Id. at 412.
39.

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the 60% capital gain deduction formerly provided

under § 1202. Repeal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1986. However,
the Tax Bill did not change characterization of gain as capital or ordinary. Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301(a), 1986 U.S. ConE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 132.
However, the maximum capital gain rate is 28% for taxable years beginning in 1987 and thereafter.
Int. Rev. Code of 1986 § 1(j).
40. 8 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 413.
41. Id. at 414.
42. 29 Misc. 2d 648, 218 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
43. Id. at 650, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 184; see also New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Converse,
373 Mass. 639, 369 N.E.2d 982 (1977) (adjustments refused under facts similar to Dick because
adjustment not practical).
44. 23 Fla. Supp. 133, 136 (Palm Beach County. Ct. 1964) (fiduciary not required to cure
inequities created by interaction of tax law with principles of estate accounting). But see Dobris,
supra note 10, at 14041:
The Dick opinion is wrong, principal should be reimbursed for lott use of a deduction.
Requiring an adjustment is the proper course of action for a court when a fiduciary's
discretionary act has caused an adjustable inequity or when the allocation of the benefits
and burdens of mandatory action is unjust under standard allocations rules.
45. For a detailed discussion on "trapping distributions" see Blattmachr, supra note 10, at
1403.3; Carrico & Bondurant, supra note 10, at 563-67 (review of statutory and judicial responses
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ting by making a partial distribution of estate principal to a trust. Normally,
this situation arises when the income beneficiary of a testamentary trust is
entitled to all accounting income earned by the estate during administration,
even though income may not be paid out to the trustee until estate administration is completed. For tax purposes, the distribution of principal constitutes
income to the trust and is deductible by the estate to the extent of DNI,4 even
though the distribution is principal on the books of the estate and is allocated
to principal on the books of the trust. 7 The distribution, therefore, even if
principal, will have the effect of shifting DNI from the estate to its beneficiary,
the trust. However, because the trust may have no accounting income to be
distributed, DNI will be trapped in the trust as corpus. This result occurs
because the income beneficiary of the trust is only entitled to distributions of
income, as opposed to corpus, and the trust is unable to distribute all its DNI
for the year. The trust will be required to pay tax on trapped DNI received
from the estate. 4' Thus, two entities, the estate and the trust, will share the
income tax burden of the estate's DNI, presumably reducing the overall tax
liability.
If the trust received income rather than corpus, it would be able to distribute
it to the income beneficiary and thus receive a section 661 deduction, to the
extent of DNI. As a result of the trapped DNI being taxable to the trust,
principal is reduced by taxes to the detriment of the principal beneficiaries.
Thus, when income of the estate actually incurring the income tax is later
49
distributed to the income beneficiary, it may be received tax free.
In In re Estate of Holloway,50 the New York Surrogate Court faced the issue
of whether an equitable adjustment was warranted in a situation involving a
trapping distribution. The court held the income account had to reimburse the
principal account for income taxes paid by the trust on the trapped distribution.-" The Surrogate Court first denied the adjustment, reasoning that section
13(c)(4) of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act required principal

in this area as well as drafting solutions); Cohan & Frimmer, Trapping Distributions: The Trap that
Pays, 112 TR. & EsT. 766 (1973); Dobris, supra note 10, at 127-30.

46. See I.R.C. §§ 661-662 (West 1986).
47.

See Blattmachr, supra note 10, at 1403.3.

48. Id.
49. The following example illustrates how a trapping distribution will result in an equitable
adjustment. Assume an estate distributes $20,000 of principal to a previously unfunded testamentary
trust created under a will. The estate had income of $50,000 and made no other distributions
during the year. Beneficiary A is entitled to principal and beneficiary B is entitled to all income
of the estate. The $20,000 distribution will carry out DNI and reduce the estate's income to $30,000
because of 5 661. The trust will be taxed on $20,000 because it may only distribute income to
B. Assuming a tax rate of 30%, trust principal will be reduced by the $6,000 of taxes. If, in the
next year, the estate distributes income to B, assuming the estate has no additional income, B will
receive $20,000 free of tax. Under principles of Holloway, the income account would be required
to reimburse principal in the amount of $6,000.
50. 67 Misc. 2d 132, 323 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sur. Ct. 1971), modified, 68 Misc. 2d 361, 327
N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sur. Ct. 1972).

51.

68 Misc. 2d at 366, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 869.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss5/5
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to pay all taxes on property allocated to principal.5 2 However, on rehearing the
court reversed its earlier decision, stating that based on purely equitable principles, the burden of income taxes should be charged to the account into which
the item goes.53 Holloway and Rice both support the proposition that, even when
non-elective tax procedures alter beneficiaries' interests, a state court may override statutory principal and income allocation rules and order an adjustment.
D.

Disproportionate Distributions

When there is more than one beneficiary of an estate and the fiduciary
makes a disproportionate distribution, a disproportionate amount of DNI may
be allocated to that beneficiary and a disproportionate amount of income will
be reportable by such beneficiary. 54 Unless an adjustment is made, each of the
remaining beneficiaries will continue to be entitled to their proportionate share
of income unreduced by any income tax (or by less tax than if the disproportionate distributions had not been made). An inequity results when the
beneficiary receiving the disproportionate distributions pays income tax on income receipts allocable to another beneficiary. The inequity exists due to the
scheme of Subchapter J: distributions are deemed to carry out estate income
for the year without regard to character as current income or principal.5 However, for fiduciary accounting purposes, estate income is distributed on a pro
rata basis with reference to the respective interests of the different beneficiaries
6
in estate principal.
Consider an estate with principal of $100,000, income of $10,000, and two
residuary beneficiaries, A and B, each entitled to equal portions of income and
principal. A and B are each entitled to $5,000 of income for the year. Suppose
$15,000 of principal is distributed to A with no distribution to B. A is taxed
on the full $10,000 of income because A is deemed to carry out DNI although
B is still entitled to B's share of income.5 7 Later, when income is distributed
to A and B, B's share will be tax free and A will have borne the burden of
B's share of taxes on the income."'
Unlike trapping distributions, there is little tax purpose for disproportionate
distributions. They usually result from thoughtless or ill-advised distributions
by the fiduciary or from a distribution to a dependent beneficiary. 59 In In re
Salesky's Estate,60 the Pennsylvania Orphans Court held that a widow, electing
to take her dower share against the will, was entitled to reimbursement for

52. 67 Misc. 2d at 133-34, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
53. 68 Misc. 2d at 365, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
54. See I.R.C. § 662 (West 1986). With respect to a trust, this may not be true as a result
of the separate share rules. Id. § 663(c).
55. See id. §§ 661-662.
56. See, e.g., N.Y. EsT. Powms & TRusts LAw § 11-2.1(a)(c) (McKinney 1967).
57. See I.R.C. §5 652, 662 (West 1986).
58. See Carrico & Bondurant, supra note 10, at 571-76; Dobris, supra note 10, at 130-36.
59. See Dobris, supra note 10, at 133 nn.177-78 and accompanying text. However, on certain
occasions the lower tax bracket of the beneficiary may result in an overall tax savings.
60. 15 Pa. Fiduc. 213 (Orphan's Ct. 1965).
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having to bear a disproportionate income tax burden on account of non-pro
rata distributions.6 Similarly, in In re Estate of Cooper,52 a Florida court held
that a widow was entitled to reimbursement for additional taxes borne by her.
However, in Cooper there was a prior agreement in which the widow reserved
the right to reimbursement, 63 thus the decision is questionable precendent.
E.

Depreciation Deductions Inuring to the Benefit of the Income Beneficiary W'Vhile
Increasing the Principal Bendficiary's Tax Burden

Pursuant to section 167(h), if no reserve for depreciation is maintained, the
depreciation deduction is allocated between beneficiaries and the trust or estate
on the basis of income allocable to each.64 Therefore, if the income beneficiaries
receive all the income and there is no provision for allocation in the trust
instrument, depreciation only reduces the income beneficiary's tax liability. Later,
when the asset is sold, a larger gain will be realized because of the reduction
in basis for depreciation. 5 Under normal fiduciary accounting, receipts of the
sale are allocable to corpus and the principal beneficiary will bear the burden
of tax on any gain or recapture, despite the income beneficiaries receiving the
benefit of depreciation deductions.
In Matter of Pross,6 6 the court, relying on Holloway,67 held that the income
beneficiary would have to bear the burden of capital gains taxes when the
income beneficiary received the benefit of depreciation. 68 While Pross has been
cited as authority for an equitable adjustment where no fiduciary discretion is

61. Id. at 215-16. The estate's income tax savings resulting from the distribution was approximately $15,000 while the widow paid approximately $10,000 in taxes on the distribution.
62. 186 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1966).
63. Id. at 844-45.
64. See I.R.C. 5 642(e) (West 1986).
65. Id. 5 1016(a)(2). For example, suppose a trust holds a capital asset with a depreciable
basis of $100,000. The trust does not provide for allocation of depreciation. In Year 1, the trust
earns income of $20,000 which it distributes to B, the income beneficiary, and depreciation of
$15,000 is allowable and is allocated entirely to B. If, on the first day of Year 2, the asset is sold
for $100,000, a taxable capital gain of $15,000 results (amount realized of $100,000 less adjusted
basis of $85,000). Gain under normal fiduciary accounting rules is taxable to the principal account.
Assuming tax on the gain is $5,000, the principal account will be reduced by $5,000 although the
income beneficiary received the benefit of depreciation. Under a Warms adjustment, the income
account should be required to reimburse principal for the capital gains tax of $5,000.
66. 90 Misc. 2d 895, 396 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sur. Ct. 1977).
67. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
68. 90 Misc. 2d at 898, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 311. Surrogate Brewster in citing Holloway stated:
If the trustees set aside the amount deducted for depreciation to preserve principal in
fulfillment of their duty, the reserve would be wholly applicable to principal and the source
of capital gain. However, in this case, there was no reserve. The capital gain is nothing
more than a paper entry which has come about by reason of the depreciation deduction
having reduced the base of the property below the amount realized upon the foreclosure.
There was no addition to appreciation of or replacment for the trust principal ....
To
the extent that the income beneficiary received the benefits of the deduction for depreciation
without any concomitant benefit to trust principal, equity requires that the charge for the
capital gains tax be placed on the person receiving the capital gain.
Id. at.898, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
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involved, the fiduciary under the New York version of the Revised Uniform
69
Principal and Income Act elected not to establish a depreciation reserve. Therefore, Pross is of questionable validity.
F.

Sale of Trust or Estate Assets

As previously discussed, fiduciary discretion in selling trust or estate assets
could result in the shifting of benefits in the RiceDick" scenario. In determining
whether to sell or distribute an asset in kind, the fiduciary is faced with another
more general dilemma. If the fiduciary distributes assets in kind, the beneficiary
will receive either a section 1014 basis or a fair market value date of distribution
basis. If assets are distributed to satisfy a pecuniary bequest, the basis to the
beneficiary will be fair market value. However, the trust or estate will recognize
a gain. 7 1 If assets are distributed in a specific distribution, their income tax
basis to the beneficiary will be a section 1014 basis;72 however, no gain is
73
recognized.
Conversely, if assets are sold at a gain, the corpus of the trust or estate
will normally bear the burden of capital gains taxes. Thus, the fiduciary must
choose between distributing the asset with the possibility of unrealized appreciation or selling the asset at the expense of principal beneficiaries. Courts have
74
generally held that trustees have the power to sell, absent a contrary provision.
At present, no statutory or common law authority exists directly supporting an
adjustment for beneficiaries suffering disproportionate income tax burdens because of sales. However, several analogies support such an adjustment. The
remainder of this paper will develop these analogies.
III.
A.

SECTION 643(e)
The General Rule

The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 added section 643(e) to control tax consequences to estates and trusts and their beneficiaries upon in kind distributions. 75 Under the general rule, when the personal representative or trustee

69. Id.; see N.Y. EsT. Powaas & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.1(a) (McKinney 1967); REv. UNIF.
PRINCIPAL & INco.iE ACT § 2, 7B U.L.A. 151 (1962).
70. See supra notes 27-44 and accompanying text.
71. Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 C.B.

286.
72. I.R.C. § 1014 (West 1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-1, 3 (West 1986).
73. I.R.C. § 663(a) (West 1986).
74. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 12, at § 133. A trustee's power to sell trust
assets is implied in equity whenever such power is necessary or useful in carrying out the trust,
even though the trust instrument is wholly silent on the subject of sale. See, e.g., Preston v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 116 Md. 211, 81 A. 523 (1911); Garesche v. Levering Inv. Co., 146 Mo.
436, 48 S.W. 653 (1898); Clark v. Fleischman, 81 Neb. 445, 116 N.W. 290 (1908); Crown Co.
v. Cohn, 88 Or. 642, 172 P. 804 (1918); Wisdom v. Wilson, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 593, 127 S.W.
1128 (1910).
75. For a detailed discussion of new § 643(e) and its impact, see Aucutt, Tax Planningfor
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makes no election, gain or loss is not recognized to the trust or estate upon
an in kind distribution.7 6 When no election is made, the beneficiary's basis in
distributed property will equal the property's adjusted basis in the trust or estate,
adjusted by any gain or loss recognized by the trust or estate. 77 Thus, the
beneficiary norrmally gets a carryover basis. The amount distributed for purposes
of sections 661 and 662 is equal to the lesser of the property's adjusted basis,
adjusted for gain or loss recognized by the trust or estate, or fair market value.78
B.

The Elective Rule

Under the elective rule, gain or loss is recognized to a trust or estate upon
an in kind distribution as if the property had been sold at fair market value.79
For purposes of sections 661(a)(2) and 662(a)(2), the amount distributed is the
fair market value of the property.80 The beneficiary's basis is the adjusted basis
of the property to the trust or estate adjusted by any gain or loss recognized
on the distribution. By requiring the trust or estate to recognize gain or loss
under the elective rule, Congress has alleviated the prior law's distortion, which
allowed a beneficiary a fair market value basis while the trust or estate recognized no gain or loss. 81
C.

In Kind Property Distributions Where Section 643(e) Is Not Applicable

Before determining application of the equitable adjustment doctrine to a
section 643(e) election, one must first determine if section 643(e) applies to the
transaction under consideration. As the subsequent discussion will illustrate, the
scope of section 643(e) is quite narrow.
Section 643(e) should not, apply to the following in kind distributions:

In-Kind Distributions Increased by New Special Election, 62 J. TAx. 48 (1985); Freeland, Maxfield &
Sawyer, Estate and Trust Distributions of Property In-Kind After the Tax Reform Act of 1984, 40 TAx L.
REv. 449 (1984); Kelly, Treatment of Property Distributed In-Kind Under the Tax Reform Act of 1984,
63 TAXEs 423 (June 1985).
76. Gain or loss may result when no election is made in two situations: (1) where the asset
has a mortgage in excess of basis, and (2) upon distribution of an installment obligation pursuant
to § 453B. Freeland, supra note 75, at 475. However, no S 1245 or § 1250 gain should be recognized
in a distribution in which no gain or loss is otherwise recognized. I.R.C. S 1245(b)(1)-(2) (West
1986); Treas. Reg. S 1.12454(a)-(b) (West 1986); I.R.C. S 1250(dXl)-(2) (West 1986); Treas. Reg.
S 1.1250-3(a)-(b) (West 1986); see Freeland, supra note 75, at 467-69.
77. I.R.C. § 643(e)(1) (West 1986).
78. Id. § 643(e)(2).
79. Id. § 643(e)(3). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 amended S 643(e)(3)(B) to provide that
election under S 643(e)(3) shall apply to all distributions made by the estate or trust during a
taxable year. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1806(b), 1986 U.S. CODE CoNo.
& ADMIN. NEws (100 Star.) 726. Thus, an election to recognize gain or loss cannot be made on
each separate distribution, as the language of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 seems to provide. Section
643(e)(3)(B) continues to provide that election must be made on the tax return for the taxable
year of the distribution.
80. I.R.C. § 643(e)(3)(A)(iii).
81. See Treas. Reg. 9 1.661(a)-(2)(t) (West 1986).
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(1) Distributions described in section 663(a).
(2) In kind distributions of property in satisfaction of pecuniary bequests not within section 663.
(3) Distributions of specific property or cash bequests directed by the
terms of the instrument and paid in more than three installments.
(4) Distributions described in sections 651(a) and 661(a)(1).
(5) Distributions of property governed by section 691.
(6) Distributions when the grantor is treated under sections 671-78
as the owner of a trust.

1. Distributions Within Section 663(a)
Section 663(a) provides that distributions within that section shall not be
included as amounts falling within sections 661(a) or 662(a). Therefore, since
sections 661 and 662 are not applicable, the estate or trust receives no deduction
and the beneficiary treats amounts received as a section 102(a) gift. Consequently, section 643(e)(4) provides an exception for distributions described in
section 663(a). Section 663(a) applies to the following distributions:
(1) Specific bequests or gifts of a specific sum of money
or property
8 2
paid or credited in not more than three installments.
(2) Amounts paid or subsequently set aside that qualify for charitable
deduction under section 642(c).8
(3) Amounts distributed to which section 651 or 661 applied in a
preceding taxable year,
because the distribution was made when required
84
in a previous year.

2.

Distributions in Satisfaction of Pecuniary Bequests, More than Three
Installments, and Under Sections 651(a)(1) and 661(a)(1)

Section 643(e) will not apply to in kind distributions of property used to
satisfy pecuniary bequests not within section 663.85 An example of such a distribution occurs when a decedent leaves his spouse fifty percent of the adjusted

82. I.R.C. S 663(a)(1) (West 1986).
83. Id. § 663(a)(2).
84. Id. § 663(a)(3).
85. See Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-l(b)(1)
(West 1986); H.R. REp. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 870, reprinted in 1984-3 C.B. 124.
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gross estate and the executor uses appreciated property to satisfy the bequest.86
Gain will be recognized and section 643(e) will not apply because there is a
deemed cash distribution rather than a property distribution.87
Distribution of a specific sum of money or item of property according to
an instrument and paid or credited in more than three installments will also
fall outside section 663(a)(1). However, section 643(e) should not apply because
any gain on appreciated property results because of satisfaction of the obligation
88
with appreciated property.
Additionally, section 643(e) should not apply to distributions under sections
651(a)(1) and 661(a)(1). These are required distributions and if appreciated
89
property is used to satisfy them, gain will be recognized.
3.

Property Representing the Right to Receive Income in Respect of
Decedent and the Grantor Trust Rules

Under section 691, income in respect of a decedent (IRD) is taxable to the
estate or beneficiaries upon receiving a distribution." IRD generally includes
amounts to which the decedent was entitled as gross income but that were not
properly includible in taxable income for a previous year or the taxable year
ending with decedent's death because of the method of accounting used.9 The
general subchapter J rules regarding distributions from trusts and estates, including section 643(e), are not applicable to distributions of rights to IRD.92
Thus, for example, if an estate distributes the right to a decedent's accrued
salary, distribution of that right will not invoke section 643(e). Instead, section
691 will apply and the salary is income to the recipient upon receipt.
Section 643(e) also will not apply to the extent the grantor trust rules of
sections 671-678 treat the grantor or another person as owner of the trust
property.9 3 The grantor trust rules override sections 661 and 662 and render
section 643(e) inapplicable.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT DOCTRINE TO A SECTION

643(e)(3)

ELECTION

As previously discussed, section 643(e) will not apply to many in kind distributions because other Code provisions or principles of common law apply 4

86. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-l(b)(1) (West 1986).
87. See Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).
88. Id.
89. See Rev. Rul. 67-74, 1967-1 C.B. 194; I.R.C. § 643(e)(2) (West 1986). But see Treas.
Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(c) (West 1986); Rev. Rul. 68-195, 1968-1 C.B. 305 (West 1986).
90. I.R.C. § 691(a) (West 1986).
91. Treas. Reg. 9 1.691(a)-(1) (West 1986).
92. Id. § 1.691(a)-4(b); Rollert Residuary Trust v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 619, 644 (1983),
aff'd, 752 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir. 1985); Freeland, supra note 75, at 463.
93. See Rev. Rul. 67-241, 1967-2 C.B. 225; Treas. Reg. S 1.671-2(d) (West 1986).
94. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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A.

In Kind Property Distributionsfrom Trusts

Section 643(e) should apply under the following fact pattern. Assume A and
B are beneficiaries of a written trust. A has a right to discretionary distributions
of trust income and corpus and B is entitled to the remainder of trust corpus
at A's death. For calendar year 1986 the trust has DNI of $100,000. The
trustee makes a discretionary distribution to A of a capital asset with a fair
market value (FMV) of $150,000 and a basis of $75,000.
Under the general rule, the trust recognizes no gain or loss on distribution
of the capital asset to A (see Table I below). A has a basis of $75,000 in the
distributed property (the asset's adjusted basis to the trust).95 The "amount
distributed" for purposes of sections 661(a)(2) and 662(a)(2) is $75,000 (the
lesser of the basis of the property to A or FMV).9 6 Assuming the trust does
not distribute any income to A during the year, A has taxable income of $75,000
as a result of the distribution.97 If A immediately sells the property for $150,000,
A will be taxed on $75,000 gain remaining in the property. The trust will
receive a distribution deduction of $75,00091 and consequently will be subject
to tax on $25,000 of undistributed DNI. 99
TABLE I
No
Election Made

Section 643(e)(3)
Election Made

TRUST
DNI
Capital Gain
Total

$100,000
$100,000

$100,000
75,000
$175,000

Distribution Deduction

(75,000)

(100,000)

Section 1202 Deduction 0 "

--

Taxable Income

25,000

Tax Rate (approx.) 101
Tax

x

95.

I.R.C. 5 643(e)(1) (WVest

96. Id. § 6 43(eX2).
97.
98.

$

.25
6,250

(

22,500)

52,500
x .35
$ 18,375

1986).

Id. § 662(a)(2).
Id. § 661(a)(2).

99. DNI of $100,000 less the $75,000 distribution deduction.
100. See supra note 39 (discussion of the repeal of § 1202 for taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1986).
101. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed tax rates applicable to trusts and estates signif-

icantly. For taxable years beginning in 1987, the top rate is 38.5% for taxable income in excess
of $15,150. For taxable years beginning in 1988, the top rate is 28% for taxable income exceeding
$5,000. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101, 1986 U.S. CODE CONo. &
ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 12 (amending I.R.C. § l(e) and adding Int. Rev. Code of 1986 § l(g)

& (h)).
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TABLE I (continued)

BENEFICIARY (A)
Section 662 Income
Capital Gain
Total
Section 1202 Deduction
Total Taxable Income
12
Tax Rate (Assumed)
Tax
OVERALL TAX LIABILITY
Trust
Beneficiary (A)

No
Election Made

Section 643(e)(3)
Election Made

$ 75,000
75,000
$150,000
(22,500)
$127,500
x .50
$ 63,750

$100,000

$

$ 18,375
50,000
$ 68,375

6,250
63,750
$ 70,000

$100,000
$100,000
x .50
$ 50,000

On the other hand, if a section 643(e)(3) election is made, different consequences occur (see Table I). The trust recognizes a $75,000 capital gain on
distribution of the property to A.'" 3 The beneficiary would receive a $150,000
basis in the property ($75,000 basis to the trust adjusted for the $75,000 gain
recognized) 104 and the "amount distributed" for purposes of sections 661(a)(2)
and 662(a)(2), and the beneficiary's basis in distributed property will be
$150,000.105 However, the distribution's deduction to the trust under section
661(a)(2), as well as taxable income to A under section 662(a)(2), is limited to
DNI.
This brings to focus the question of whether capital gain recognized by the
trust increases DNI. The election does not automatically cause DNI to increase.
If a section 643(e)(3) election results in capital gain in the year of termination
of the trust or estate, capital gain will enter the DNI computation. 10 6 Section
643(a) ordinarily provides for capital gain exclusion from DNI. However, Treasury Regulation section 1.643(a)-(3) sets out three situations when capital gains
are included in DNI:
(1) Capital gains 'are allocated by the fiduciary to income under the
terms of the trust instrument or local law either on the books or by
notice to the beneficiary.

102. This example assumes a taxable year ending December 31, 1986. The Tax Reform Act
of 1986 reduced the top income tax rate for individuals significantly. The top marginal rate is
38.5% and 28%, respectively, for taxable year 1987 and years beginning in 1988 and beyond.
The maximum rate on capital gains beginning January 1, 1987 is 28%. Int. Rev. Code of 1986

§1).
103.
104.
105.
106.

I.R.C. S 643(e)(3)(A)(ii) (West 1986).
Id. S 643(eX1).
Id. 5 643(e)(1), (e)(3)(A)(iii).
Id. 5 643(a)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.643(a)-3(a)(2) (West 1986).
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(2) Capital gains are allocated to corpus but actually distributed to
beneficiaries during the year.
(3) Capital gains are utilized under the terms of the instrument or
in practice by the fiduciary in determining the amount to be distributed.
In the hypothetical, the first requisite above is not met, assuming the governing instrument is silent as to allocation of capital gains and local law requires
allocation to corpus." 7 The second instance under the regulations requiring
capital gains to be included in DNI only applies if there is a distribution
required by the governing instrument upon the happening of a specified event.10 8
In this hypothetical, no such condition for inclusion is present. The third instance under the regulations occurs when capital gains are utilized in determining the amount distributed or required to be distributed. Under our
hypothetical, this requisite is not satisfied. Thus, under the hypothetical, the
capital gain of $75,000 is excluded from DNI. 09
Therefore, taxable income to A and the distribution deduction to the trust
are limited to $100,000, the amount of DNI. A receives property with a $150,000
basis but is only taxed on $100,000. In effect, A receives $50,000 in property
tax free. The trust, however, recognizes the full $75,000 gain. Thus, B, the
remainder beneficiary, bears the tax burden because the tax reduces principal
in the trust. At the same time, A receives the benefit of a $50,000 tax-free
step up in basis.
This hypothetical illustrates how a section 643(e)(3) election might benefit
one beneficiary at the expense of another and creates an opportunity to apply
the equitable adjustment doctrine. The consequences of a section 643(e)(3) election appear to be similar to the result in a Warms" ° type situation. Applying
the Warms rationale, the trustee would be required to adjust the income account
by reimbursing principal for increased taxes to the trust resulting from the
section 643(e)(3) election. Referring to Table I, the election reduced combined
taxes to the trust and beneficiary A but resulted in an increase in tax to the
trust of $12,125 (while A's tax was reduced by $13,750). Warms would require
the trustee to transfer $12,125 from the income account to the principal account.
Even after adjustment, A realizes a net reduction in tax liability as a result of
the election and receives a $50,000 step up in basis.
The applicability of an adjustment to a section 643(e)(3) election is further

107.
PRINCIPAL

See, e.g., UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT 9 3(2), 7B U.L.A. 192 (1931); REv. UNIF.
& INCOME ACT S 3(b)(1), 7B U.L.A. 155 (1962); see also Rev. Rul. 69-392, 1968-2 C.B.

284.
108. See Treas. Reg. S 1.643(a)-3(d), examples (3), (4) & (5) (West 1986); Rev. Rul. 68-392,
1968-2 C.B. 284.

109.
-

See Rev. Rul. 68-392, 1968-2 C.B. 284; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,506,005 (Nov. 7, 1984), IRS

LTR. RULINGS REP. (CCH) No. 416 (Feb. 20, 1985); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,429,005 (Mar. 26, 1984),

IRS - LTR. RULINCGS REP. (CCH) No. 386 (July 25, 1984); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,324,002 (Feb. 16,
1983), IRS - LTR. RULINGs REP. (CCH) No. 329 (June 22, 1983); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,105,028 (Oct.
28, 1980), IRS - LTR. RULINGS REP. (CCH) No. 206 (Feb. 11, 1981).
110. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
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supported by Rice."' Although no fiduciary election was involved, the adjustment
resulted as a consequence of the exclusion of capital gains from DNI. In addition, the section 643(e)(3) election, similar to a trapping distribution, is normally made to minimize overall taxes of the trust or estate and its beneficiaries.
Holloway, which required the income account to reimburse principal for tax paid
on a trapped distribution, also supports adjustment after a section 643(e)(3)
election.1

2

The applicability of an equitable adjustment with respect to a section 643(e)
election may be compared with adjustments made when the fiduciary decides
to sell an asset and recognize gain, distributing proceeds rather than distributing
the asset in kind with unrealized appreciation.1 3 As pointed out earlier, no
present authority directly authorizes an adjustment though, under Warms, it
appears to be warranted. The exercise of a fiduciary's discretion to make a
sale of a trust asset or a section 643(e)(3) election may benefit one beneficiary
at the expense of another and create a situation in need of an equitable adjustment.
In the previous hypothetical, if the facts remained the same but the trust
was required to distribute trust income to A, different consequences, as shown
in Table II, result. By making an election, the combined tax liability of the
trust and A is reduced by $7,875. However, the tax liability of the trust is increased by $18,375. Thus, under the Warms rationale, the trustee would be required to reimburse the principal account for $18,375. The income beneficiary
may argue for limiting the reimbursement amount to $16,250, the beneficiary's

TABLE II
No
Election Made

Section 643(e)(3)
Election Made

$100,000

$100,000

TRUST
DNI
Capital Gain

Total
Section 661(a)(1) Deduction
Section 661(a)(2) Deduction
Section 1202 Deduction" 4
Taxable Income
Tax Rate1 5
Tax

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See
See
See
See
See

-

_

$100,000
(100,000)
0,000
-

_

$

0,000

75,000

$175,000
(100,000)

(22,500)
$ 52,500
x .35
$ 18,375

8 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 413.
68 Misc. 2d at 365, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
supra S II.F.
supra note 100.
supra note 101.
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TABLE II (continued)
No
Election Made
BENEFICIARY (A)
Section 662(a)(1)
Section 662(a)(2)
Capital Gain
Total
Section 1202 Deduction
Taxable Income
16
Tax Rate"
Tax
OVERALL TAX LIABILITY
Trust
Beneficiary (A)

Section 643(e)(3)
Election Made

$100,000
$ 75,000
$175,000
(22,500)
$152,500
x .50
$ 76,250
$

0,000
76,250
$ 76,250

$100,000

$100,000
$100,000
x .50
$ 50,000
$ 18,375
50,000
$ 68,375

tax reduction related to the election. Such an argument is not supported by
Warms, which only focused on the increase in estate taxes resulting from a section 642(g) election, not decreases in estate income taxes inuring to the benefit
11 7
of the party favoring the election.
B.

Effect of Ordinary Income Recognition Provisions

The above hypotheticals involved distribution of assets resulting in capital
gain recognition due to a section 643(e)(3) election. The inequitable consequences occur at least partially because capital gain is generally excluded from
DNI.118 However, when section 1245 or 1250 gain is recognized,11 9 DNI is
increased and partially eliminates the need for an equitable adjustment. An
adjustment would not be necessary because the distributee beneficiary would
not be getting a tax free step up in basis, since the amount taxable to the
beneficiary would also be increased by the sections 1245 and 1250 income.
In addition, when a trustee makes a section 643(e)(3) election, section 1239
characterizes any gain recognized by related persons as ordinary income, provided the distributed property is subject to depreciation in the distributee's
hands.1 20 For purposes of section 1239, the trust and a beneficiary with more

116. See supra note 102.
117. See Warms, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
118.

See supra notes 39, 100-102.

119. Sections 1245 and 1250 gain lurking in property distributed in kind should not be required
to be recognized in a distribution in which no gain or loss is otherwise recognized (i.e., where no
S 643(e)(3) election is made). See I.R.C. SS 1245(b)(1),(2), 1250(d)(1),(2) (West 1986).
120. See id. $ 1239(a)-(b)(2).
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than a remote contingent interest are related persons. 2 1 However; section 1239
does not apply to estates. 122 Therefore, to the extent section 1239 applies, ordinary income will increase DNI and, as discussed with respect to sections 1245
and 1250 recapture, section 1239 will partially or totally eliminate the need for
an equitable adjustment. Likewise, a section 643(e)(3) election may result in
section 1231 ordinary gain also increasing DNI and having an effect on any
possible equitable adjustment similar to sections 1245, 1250 and 1239.
Circumstances might warrant an equitable adjustment when the fiduciary
makes an election under section 643(e)(3) and capital loss is recognized. However, this will only occur in an estate if section 267, regarding losses between
related parties, disallows the loss when a trustee makes an election. 123
V.

TAX

EFFECT OF THE EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT

Although beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that an equitable adjustment as a result of a section 643(e)(3) election may have further
tax ramifications to the entity and beneficiary.12 For example, making an adjustment could reduce taxable income of the income beneficiary and reduce the
distribution deduction to the trust if the trust is required to distribute all income
to the beneficiary. 125 Neither the courts nor the Service have explored all the
detailed tax ramifications of equitable adjustments and, therefore, the overall
effect of an adjustment pursuant to a section 643(e)(3) election is speculative.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In certain situations a fiduciary's section 643(e)(3) election to recognize capital gain or loss upon in kind distributions from a trust or estate may lead to
inequitable consequences to beneficiaries. This results from the interaction of
the DNI scheme and local law. In such circumstances the policy first established
in Warms argues for an equitable adjustment, provided no provision in the
trust instrument or will directs otherwise. The Warms adjustment, although not
uniformly applied, has often been adopted where inequitable consequences result
from a fiduciary's election. It is applied less frequently when the election or
discretion has not been exercised.
The section 643(e)(3) election most often arises when the fiduciary, pursuant
to his duty to minimize taxes, seeks to lower overall tax liability of the trust
or estate and the beneficiaries. However, as illustrated, one beneficiary may
have an increase in tax liability while another beneficiary's tax liability is reduced. Thus, the exercise of the fiduciary's duty to minimize taxes conflicts

121.

Id. 5 1239(b)(2).

122. See id. S 1239(b) (not included in the definition of "related persons").
123. Id. S 267(a)-(b)(6).
124. See Blattmachr, supra note 10, at 1400.
125. Id. at
1404.1, 1410. However, by reducing the amount of accounting income, DNI
that would otherwise be taxed to the beneficiary is not taxed to the corpus of the trust, which
may warrant a further adjustment. Id.
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with his duty of impartiality. An equitable adjustment among the beneficiaries
is often necessary to enable the fiduciary to satisfy both duties.
Draftsmen should ensure that fiduciaries are given the flexibility and necessary powers to make appropriate elections, including the new section 643(e)(3)
election. Furthermore, it would be appropriate for the trust or will instrument
to specify that no tax election will create the need for equitable adjustments
among beneficiaries whose interests might be affected. In other cases it might
be appropriate for the governing instrument to specifically require equitable
adjustment in the event of a section 643(e)(3) election. Only through an understanding of the new section 643(e)(3) election and the principles of the equitable
adjustment doctrine can the proper decision be made.
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